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This review paper, prepared for the forthcoming Russell Sage volume Changing Poverty, considers
the ability of different education policies to improve the learning outcomes of low-income children
in America.  Disagreements on this question stem in part from different beliefs about the problems
with our nation's public schools.  In our view there is some empirical support for each of the general
concerns that have been raised about public schools serving high-poverty student populations, including:
the need for more funding for those school inputs where additional spending is likely to pass a benefit-cost
test; limited capacity of many schools to substantially improve student learning by improving the quality
of instruction on their own; and the need for improved incentives for both teachers and students, and
for additional operational flexibility.  Evidence suggests that the most productive changes to existing
education policies are likely to come from increased investments in early childhood education for
poor children, improving the design of the federal No Child Left Behind accountability system, providing
educators with incentives to adopt practices with a compelling research base while expanding efforts
to develop and identify effective instructional regimes, and continued support and evaluation of a variety
of public school choice options.
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  One of the best ways to avoid being poor as an adult in America is to obtain a good 
education.  As Magnuson and Votruba-Drzal (2009) note, individuals with higher academic 
achievement and more years of schooling earn more than those with lower levels of human 
capital.  This is not surprising given that we believe that schooling makes people more 
productive, allowing them to command higher wages in the labor market.  
Yet, in modern America disadvantaged children face an elevated risk for a variety of 
adverse educational outcomes.  According to the 2007 National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP), only 16 percent of fourth grade students eligible for free lunch score at 
proficient levels in reading compared with 44 percent of fourth graders whose family incomes 
are above the eligibility cutoff for free lunch; the disparity in math scores is even larger, 21 
versus 53 percent (NCES 2007).  Equally large disparities in achievement test scores are 
observed between whites and minority racial or ethnic groups, with gaps that show up as early as 
age three or four (Jencks and Phillips, 1998, Neal, 2007).
1 
Understanding why children’s outcomes vary so dramatically along race and class lines in 
America is central to formulating effective education policy interventions.  Disagreements about 
how to improve schooling outcomes for poor children stem in part from different beliefs about 
what problems underlie the unsatisfactory outcomes found in too many of our nation’s public 
schools.  Broadly speaking, critics tend to invoke, at least implicitly, one of the following 
reasons why children in high-poverty schools are not performing as well as we would like:   
                                                 
1 Note that these disparities in schooling outcomes along race and class lines are not simply due to immigration into 
the U.S. by those with low initial levels of English or other academic skills, since for example reading and math 
disparities in NAEP scores are large among 4
th and 8
th graders even between non-Hispanic whites versus non-
Hispanic blacks (www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/nde, accessed on August 4, 2008).   3
1.  Schools serving poor and minority students have fewer resources (e.g., text books, teachers, 
support services) than they need to educate the disadvantaged students they serve.  In this 
case, a potential solution would be to provide more money to disadvantaged schools. 
2.  High-poverty schools lack the capacity to substantially improve student learning, 
independent of financial resources.  Under this perspective the teachers and administrators in 
highly disadvantaged school districts are thought to lack the skills or knowledge necessary to 
improve the quality of instruction on their own.  Potential solutions to this problem would 
involve helping schools improve the quality of their standard operating practices, for 
example by helping implement specific new instructional or organizational practices (i.e., 
curriculum, instruction, school organization) and/or increasing the instructional capacity of 
staff in these schools through professional development or more selective hiring.  The 
success of this approach depends critically on whether there are particular instructional, 
organizational, human resource or other practices that are known to be effective, and how 
easily these practices could be implemented across different contexts.  
3.  High-poverty schools do not have sufficient incentives and/or flexibility.  High-poverty 
schools are under-performing because teachers and administrators are not working hard 
enough, they are not working toward the right goal, or they have good local knowledge about 
what would work best but they are not able to implement these ideas because of centralized 
authority.  Proponents of this perspective often claim that without clarifying the key 
objectives of school and holding key actors accountable, additional spending will simply be 
squandered.  Under this view, the solution would be to enhance incentives and provide local 
actors more flexibility through policies such as school choice or accountability.    4
4.  Schools matter only so much.  The real problem rests with the social context in which 
schools operate – namely, the family, neighborhood and peer environments that low-income 
children experience.  Adopting accountability or market-oriented education reforms without 
changing social policy more broadly will simply punish educators for factors beyond their 
control, and potentially drive the most able teachers toward schools serving less 
disadvantaged students.  In this case, a necessary condition for making serious improvements 
in poor children’s schooling outcomes would involve fixing the other social ills associated 
with poverty that impair children’s learning outcomes, such as poor health care or high 
unemployment.   
For some reason current policy debates often seem to be argued as if the problems above 
are mutually exclusive.  In contrast, we believe that there is likely some truth to each of these 
major explanations.  Moreover, it seems plausible that the underlying problems confronting our 
schools might interact in complicated ways.  For example, it may be the case that certain 
curriculum reforms are effective only if they are accompanied by an increase in resources such 
as student support services, or by an increase in teacher quality generated by better professional 
development and/or reforms to hiring and tenure policies 
  Research over the past four decades has unfortunately fostered the impression that when 
it comes to interventions for the most disadvantaged public schools in our country “nothing 
works.”  One of the first studies to do so was the landmark 1966 report by sociologist James 
Coleman and his colleagues.  By drawing on a large, nationally representative sample, the 
Coleman Report found that most of the variation in student achievement occurs within rather 
than across schools, that family background is the strongest predictor of academic achievement, 
and that most measurable school inputs like student-teacher ratios are only weakly correlated   5
with student outcomes.  Subsequent evaluation studies also tended to be disappointing and 
helped contribute to a sense of pessimism about the ability of schools to lift poor children’s life 
chances (Levin, 1977, Glazer, 1986, Jencks, 1986). 
In contrast, our chapter offers a message of tempered optimism.  The past few decades 
have seen a dramatic improvement in the technology of education policy evaluation, which has 
enhanced our ability to uncover moderately-sized program impacts within the complex 
environment that determines schooling outcomes.  The available evidence reveals a number of 
potentially promising ways to improve the learning outcomes of low-income children.  This is 
not to say that everything works:  many current and proposed education policies either enjoy no 
empirical support for their effectiveness, or in some cases have strong empirical evidence for 
their ineffectiveness.  But a careful sifting of the empirical evidence identifies a selected set of 
interventions that seem to be promising. 
Our optimism is tempered by the recognition that even the most successful educational 
interventions will reduce, but not eliminate, racial and social class disparities in educational 
outcomes.  But the usual standard of public economics for judging policy interventions is that 
they generate benefits that exceed their cost.  Under this benefit-cost standard, education policies 
that are capable of improving poor children’s schooling outcomes by enough to justify the costs 
of these new programs are worth doing, even if these programs by themselves are not enough to 
equalize learning opportunities for all children in America. 
While we recognize that the social context of children’s lives plays a large role in their 
schooling outcomes, the focus of this chapter involves school-specific policies.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the direct link between a child’s family background and their 
learning outcomes, see Magnuson and Votruba-Drzal (2009).   6
The distinction between the role of family background and school-specific policies is 
blurred by the fact that the concentration of low-income and minority students within schools can 
have important implications for the success of school-specific policies.
2  A growing body of 
empirical evidence suggests that policies that can effectively reduce the amount of racial (and by 
implication socio-economic) segregation within schools may help improve the schooling 
outcomes of disadvantaged children (see Vigdor and Ludwig, 2008 for a review).  Yet there are 
substantial barriers – both logistical and political – to further integrating schools along race or 
class lines.  There is substantial residential segregation in our country, which limits the amount 
of school desegregation that can be accomplished since the U.S. Supreme Court made it very 
difficult to enact across-district plans in the Milliken v. Bradley decision (418 US 717, 1974).  
More generally, the majority of Supreme Court decisions on school desegregation since the early 
1970s have restricted the ability of districts to promote integration (Kahlenberg, 2001), including 
two recent decisions striking down desegregation plans in Seattle and Louisville.  It may be that 
school desegregation efforts are unable dramatically improve the lot of poor children in 
American schools.  In any case in what follows, we assume that the distribution of poor and 
minority children across schools is fixed, and consider the ability of different education policies 
to improve their learning outcomes given this reality. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  In Section II, we review three 
specific areas in which we believe increased resources may yield important benefits for poor 
children: early childhood interventions, class size reductions in the early grades that hold the 
quality of teachers constant, and bonuses to attract and retain the highest-quality teachers in 
disadvantaged schools.  In Section III, we examine reforms that do not require a large investment 
                                                 
2 For example, all else equal the typical teacher seems to prefer working in schools that serve more affluent and less 
racially diverse student bodies (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 2004), which may have implications for policy efforts 
designed to improve the quality of teachers in high-poverty areas.   7
of resources, but instead seek to make specific changes in the ways schools operate, ranging 
from changes in curriculum and instruction to changes in teacher hiring and promotion policy.  
The available evidence for effective changes in school practices are limited, but this problem 
could be overcome if federal and state governments did more to require schools to use methods 
that have been proven effective (Jacob and Ludwig, 2005).  In Section IV, we review the 
literature on school accountability and school choice policies, which aim to change the goals, 
incentives and organizational structure within which schools and families operate.  The evidence 
on school accountability is moderately encouraging, though recent findings suggest that the 
design of accountability policies matters a great deal. There is less evidence that current public or 
private school choice plans improve student outcomes, but there are likely to be benefits from 
continued experimentation with and evaluation of a variety of choice options by states and 
school districts.  Finally in Section V, we summarize what we believe the available empirical 
evidence suggests are the most promising education policies for improving the life chances of 
disadvantaged children. 
II. SCHOOL RESOURCES 
The question of whether “money matters” has been the subject of contentious debate in 
the research literature for the past 40 years.  Isolating the causal effects of extra school funding is 
complicated by the possibility that compensatory spending may be directed towards those 
schools serving the most disadvantaged students, and adequately controlling for all aspects of 
student disadvantage is quite difficult in practice.  A few recent studies have used policy changes 
that generate sharp changes in school funding and find some impact on student outcomes (Figlio, 
1997, Card and Payne, 2002, Guryan, 2003).  Overall, however, there is fairly weak support for 
the idea that increases in unrestricted school funding will improve student outcomes (see for   8
example Hanushek 1997).  In contrast, there is stronger evidence that some targeted increases in 
specific school inputs can improve student outcomes.  In this section, we discuss three specific 
areas in which we believe increased resources may yield important benefits for poor children: 
increased investments in early childhood education; class size reductions in the early grades; and 
targeted salary bonuses to help disadvantaged schools recruit and retain better teachers.  
A. Early childhood education 
Disparities in academic achievement by race and class are apparent as early as age three 
and four, well before children enter kindergarten.  Recent research in neuroscience, 
developmental psychology, economics, and other fields suggests that the earliest years of life are 
a particularly promising time to intervene in the lives of low-income children (Shonkoff and 
Phillips, 2000, Carniero and Heckman, 2003, Knudsen et al., 2006).  Studies show that early 
childhood educational programs can generate learning gains in the short-run and, in some cases, 
improve the long-run life chances of poor children. Moreover, the benefits generated by these 
programs are large enough to justify their costs. 
The Perry Preschool and Abecedarian programs are commonly cited as examples of how 
high-quality preschool services can change the lives of low-income children. A small group of 
children who participated in the these programs in the 1960s and 1970s have been followed for 
many years and on average have better outcomes in a range of domains compared to a randomly 
assigned group of control children (Schweinhart et al., 2005; Ramey and Campbell, 1979; 
Campbell et al., 2002; Barnett and Masse, 2007).  Despite the high cost of these programs, these 
studies suggest that the total economic benefit of these programs exceeded their costs (Belfield et 
al., 2006; Barnett and Masse, 2007).  While these results are encouraging, it is important to keep   9
in mind that these are model programs that were unusually intensive and involved small numbers 
of children in just two sites. 
Yet evidence on publicly funded early education programs, which illustrate what can be 
achieved for large numbers of children in programs of variable quality, is also very encouraging.  
A recent random-assignment evaluation of Head Start found positive short-term effects of 
program participation on a variety of cognitive skills on the order of .2 to .4 standard deviations,
3 
with typically positive effects on non-cognitive outcomes as well that are usually not statistically 
significant.  A rigorous evaluation of Early Head Start, a program serving children under age 
three in a mix of home and center-based programs, found positive effects on some aspects of 
parent practices and children’s development, but the effects were generally smaller than for Head 
Start (Love et al. 2002).  
Wong et al. (2008) find that several recent state-initiated universal pre-K programs have 
even larger impacts on short-term cognitive test scores than does Head Start (see also Gormley et 
al., 2005; Gormley and Gayer, 2005).  Why might the new state pre-K programs generate larger 
cognitive gains than does Head Start?  One explanation is that pre-K programs hire more 
qualified teachers, pay them more, and offer a more academically oriented curriculum than do 
Head Start programs.  Another explanation is that the Head Start comparison group received 
more center-based care than did children in the pre-K comparison group.
4  A third possible 
explanation is that the recent Head Start study relies on a rigorous randomized experimental 
                                                 
3 The official evaluation of the program found impacts on elementary pre-reading and pre-writing skills equal to 
about 0.3 and 0.2 of a standard deviation respectively (Puma et al. 2005; Ludwig and Phillips, 2007).  If one 
calculates Head Start impacts by pooling together the three- and four-year-olds in the experiment, the increased 
statistical power leads to significant program impacts on math scores and on almost all of the other main cognitive 
skill outcomes in the report (Ludwig and Phillips, 2007).   
4 http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/events/briefingdec06-cook/slide16.html   10
design, while the research design of the new state pre-K studies is more susceptible to bias from 
selection problems (see Ludwig and Phillips, 2007).
 5 
While these short-run achievement gains from both Head Start and newer state pre-K 
programs are impressive, the crucial question is whether these effects persist over time.  In order 
to explore longer-run impacts, one must rely on non-experimental studies of children who 
participated in Head Start decades ago and control for potential confounding factors (Currie and 
Thomas, 1995; Garces, Thomas and Currie, 2002; Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Deming, 2007).  
These studies suggest lasting effects on schooling attainment and perhaps criminal activity, 
although test score effects appear to fade out over time.  Nonetheless, the positive long-term 
effects seem large enough to generate benefits that likely outweigh the program costs. 
It is possible that the long-term effects of Head Start on more recent cohorts of children 
may be different from those for previous cohorts of program participants because program 
quality changes over time, or because the developmental quality of the environments that 
children would experience as an alternative to Head Start change.  But the short-term test score 
impacts that have been estimated for recent cohorts of Head Start participants appear to be 
similar to what we see for earlier cohorts of children for whom we also now have evidence of 
long-term benefits.  So there is room for cautious optimism that Head Start might improve the 
long-term outcomes for recent waves of program participants as well, even though this cannot be 
directly tested for many years (Ludwig and Phillips, 2007). 
Although preschool interventions represent a promising way to improve the life chances 
of poor children, their success is not well reflected in federal government budget priorities, 
which allocate nearly seven times as much money per capita for K-12 schooling as for pre-
                                                 
5 Some prior research has found that while pre-kindergarten programs improve cognitive outcomes, they may have 
adverse effects on non-cognitive outcomes like self-control (see, for example, Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel, 
2004).  The evidence on this issue is not yet available for the new state pre-K programs.   11
kindergarten (pre-K), other forms of early education and child care subsidies for three- to five-
year-olds.
  Most social policies attempt to make up for the disadvantages poor children 
experience early in life.  But given the substantial disparities between poor and non-poor 
children that already exist among very young children, it is perhaps not surprising that many 
disadvantaged children never catch up.  There may be very high returns indeed to increased 
investments in improving young children’s school readiness with proven, high-quality programs.   
B. Class size reduction 
  Reducing average class sizes may enable teachers to spend more time working with 
individual students, tailor instruction to match children’s needs, and make it easier for teachers to 
monitor classroom behavior.  Class size reductions are not inexpensive, however.  They require 
hiring additional teachers and in some cases expanding a school’s physical space.  Nonetheless, 
the best available evidence suggests that class size reduction, holding teacher quality constant, 
can improve student outcomes by enough to justify these additional expenditures, with benefits 
that are particularly pronounced for low-income and minority children. 
  The evidence in favor of class size reduction comes mainly from Tennessee’s Project 
STAR, which randomly assigned 11,600 students in grades K-13 and 1,330 teachers to small 
classes (13-17 students), regular size classrooms (22-25 students), or regular size classrooms that 
also included a teacher’s aide.
6  Teachers were also randomly assigned to different classroom 
environments in this study, which ensured that the average quality of teachers in small versus 
regular size classrooms is the same, a critical point to which we will return within the context of 
policy efforts to take class size reduction to scale.  Class size reductions of around one-third 
during these early grades increased Stanford-9 reading and math scores by around 0.12 standard 
deviations for whites and 0.24 standard deviations for blacks.  Impacts were larger for students 
                                                 
6 This section is based on the summary of Project STAR research by Schanzenbach (2006/7).   12
attending mostly black schools, although even within such schools, black students benefited 
somewhat more than did whites (Krueger and Whitmore, 2002).  Similarly, impacts were 
somewhat larger for students eligible for the free lunch program.   
Follow-up evaluations of STAR find long-term benefits of attending a small elementary 
school class – the test score impacts seem to persist through 8
th grade, although they decline by 
one-half to two-thirds (Achilles et al., 1993, Nye et al., 1995, Krueger and Whitmore, 2001).  As 
with the short-term effects, the eighth grade test scores reveal larger gains among low-income 
and minority students. Moreover, black students in the treatment group were roughly 5 
percentage points (or 15 percent) more likely to take a college entrance exam (i.e., the SAT or 
ACT) during high school (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001, 2002).
7  The test score gains induced by 
smaller classes in STAR are probably large enough to justify the costs, even when we focus just 
on the benefits that arise from test scores on future earnings alone (Krueger, 2003, Krueger and 
Whitmore, 2001, Schanzenbach, 2006/7). 
  The results from Project STAR are encouraging, but they come from a controlled 
experiment that held the quality of teachers constant by randomly assigning teachers as well as 
students across classrooms.  A sobering example of the challenges of taking class size reduction 
to scale comes from the California experience.  California introduced a statewide initiative to 
reduce primary grade class sizes in 1998-99, which required schools to not only hire a large 
number of new teachers, but also find additional physical space for the new classrooms 
(Borhnstedt and Stecher 2002; Jepsen and Rivkin 2002).  The policy was implemented over a 
short time period.  Many low-income school districts found it difficult to hire qualified teachers, 
and had trouble arranging for adequate classroom space.  Jepsen and Rivkin (2002) argue that 
                                                 
7 Effects for outcomes such as criminal involvement or teen births yield point estimates that are in the direction of 
beneficial CSR impacts, but are imprecisely estimated (Schanzenbach, 2007).   13
much of the benefit from smaller classes in California was lost due to reductions in average 
teacher quality, particularly in lower-income urban school districts. 
California’s experience suggests the complexity of taking education policy reforms to a 
large scale.  It suggests the potential value of focusing class size reductions in low-income 
districts or schools, as well as the importance of careful implementation of the program so as to 
minimize any adverse effects on teacher quality or physical capital.  So long as these 
implementation efforts did not raise costs too much relative to STAR, it still seems plausible that 
a large scale program to reduce class sizes might pass a benefit-cost test. 
C. Bonuses for teaching in high-needs schools or subjects  
Research has identified substantial variation across teachers in the ability to raise student 
achievement.  These studies estimate teacher effectiveness by comparing changes in student 
achievement scores across classrooms, controlling for student, classroom and school 
characteristics that influence achievement regardless of the teacher.  Because these studies 
attempt to isolate the value that a teacher adds to student achievement, they are referred to as 
“teacher value-added” studies.  These studies document substantial variation in teacher 
effectiveness, both within and across schools. According to a recent analysis of NYC elementary 
school math teachers, for example, students whose teacher falls in the top quarter of 
effectiveness learn roughly 0.33 test score standard deviations more in a single year than students 
whose teachers are in the bottom quarter (Kane et al. 2006).
8  If disadvantaged children were 
taught by the most effective teachers, disparities in schooling outcomes might be narrowed. 
                                                 
8 There are three concerns with value-added measures of effectiveness.  One involves the statistical precision of the 
measures; the other involves the possible biases inherent in such measures.  First, given the small number of 
students that an individual teacher works with in any given year (i.e., 15 or 20 for many elementary school teachers) 
and the imperfect reliability of student achievement tests, teacher “value-added” measures are generally measured 
with considerable error (Kane and Staiger, 2002a,b).  That is, the “confidence interval” around an estimate of a 
teacher’s effectiveness is often quite large.  A second problem is that students are not randomly assigned to   14
Value-added measures of teacher effectiveness are not very strongly correlated with the 
easiest-to-observe characteristics of teachers.  On the one hand, novice teachers are less effective 
than more experienced ones, but this experience premium disappears after the first few years of 
teaching (Rockoff 2004).  Teachers who have higher scores on the SAT or various teaching 
exams are generally more effective than others (Harris and Sass 2007, Clotfelter et al. 2007).  On 
the other hand, there is little if any difference in the achievement gains of students assigned to 
traditionally certified, alternatively certified or uncertified teachers (Kane et al. 2006; Boyd et al. 
2005).  Similarly, researchers have found that teachers who have advanced degrees are not more 
effective than other teachers (Hanushek 1997). 
Hence, the policy challenge in this domain is to induce more effective teachers to teach in 
schools serving the most disadvantaged children, knowing that effectiveness cannot easily be 
measured. Given the relationship between wages and teacher labor supply (see, for example, 
Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Stinebrickner 2002; and Scafidi, Stinebrickner, & Sjoquist, 
2007), one strategy is to entice teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools and/or subjects through 
financial incentives such as targeted salary increases or bonuses since.  While many states have 
adopted some sort of financial assistance programs (e.g., loan forgiveness, mortgage assistance, 
salary supplements), there has been little systematic evaluation  (Imazeki 2007, Gaurino et al. 
2006, Glazerman et al. 2006). 
Evaluation of a targeted teacher bonus in North Carolina suggests the program was 
successful in reducing teacher turnover rates in low-income or low-performing schools 
(Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd and Vigdor, 2006).  In California from 2000 to 2002 the Governor’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
classrooms, and hard-to-measure student characteristics may influence the rate of growth in children’s test scores 
not just their levels.  So value-added measures may partly confound the causal contribution of the teacher to student 
learning with those of the characteristics of their students (Rothstein 2007).  A third concern is that the impact of 
having an effective teacher may fade out over time (Jacob et al. 2008).   15
Teaching Fellowship program offered academically talented teaching candidates $20,000 
bonuses to work in low-performing schools, which was found to increase the rate at which such 
teachers started working in disadvantaged schools but did not seem to influence subsequent 
retention rates (Steele et al. 2008).  Key questions that remain include whether such programs 
will successfully lure new teachers into the profession who would not otherwise have taught, 
rather than just re-sort a fixed pool of teachers across schools, and how long any talented new 
teachers who are drawn into teaching will remain.  Moreover, financial incentives that are not 
tied to teacher performance might induce ineffective teachers to locate in hard-to-staff schools.   
III. CHANGING SCHOOL PRACTICES 
  In the previous section, we identified several reforms that seem likely to improve 
achievement of poor children. Yet all of these policy changes are expensive, and so must 
compete for scarce government resources with a variety of other pressing societal concerns.  
Some observers of America’s schooling system remain skeptical that additional spending is 
needed to improve the learning outcomes of poor children.  They argue that by improving the 
ways in which schools are organized, including the way they deliver instruction, one could 
improve student achievement with few additional resources. This line of reasoning assumes there 
is good evidence on which practices are most effective, but that school personnel do not have the 
capacity to identify or implement these programs on their own.  
In the section below, we review the evidence on a variety of reforms, and find some low-
cost changes in school operating practices that seem to improve student outcomes, including 
changes to school organization, classroom instruction and teacher hiring and promotion. What 
remains unclear is the degree to which these “best practices” have not been more widely adopted   16
because of a lack of information, political resistance, bureaucratic inertia or some combination of 
these (or other) barriers.   
A. Curricular and Instructional Interventions  
  In 2002, the Institute for Education Sciences (IES) within the U.S. Department of 
Education created the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) in order to collect and disseminate 
scientific evidence on various educational interventions. A brief review of the WWC website 
highlights the lack of convincing evidence on curricular interventions.  For example, WWC 
found only one program with strong evidence of improving reading achievement among 
beginning readers (i.e., Reading Recovery), one program for elementary school math (i.e., 
Everyday Mathematics) and two programs for middle school math (I Can Learn Algebra/Pre-
Algebra and Saxon Middle School Math).  Moreover, WWC excluded many studies that did not 
meet a minimal standard of evidence, and even the programs for which there is strong evidence 
of success according to WWC show a disappointingly low level of rigorous research.  For 
example, the Everyday Mathematics curriculum was introduced in 1983 and has been used in 
175,000 classrooms by around 2.8 million students (WWC 2007).  Yet, WWC only found four 
studies of Everyday Mathematics that met their minimal standards of evidence “with 
reservations.”  This lack of success is not limited to traditional “paper and pencil” curricula. 
There is also little evidence that educational software programs have significant impacts on 
student learning despite their growing popularity (Dynarski et al. 2007). 
  A more recent approach to school improvement known as Comprehensive or Whole 
School Reform (CSR), attempts to improve many different aspects of the school at the same 
time, hopefully in a fashion that makes the changes complementary and reinforcing.  For 
example, a CSR model may combine curriculum materials, professional development, teacher   17
mentoring, reorganization of the school day (e.g., block scheduling) and school structure (e.g., 
schools-within-a-school).  Examples include Success for All (Borman and Hewes 2003), Comer 
Schools (Cook et al. 2000), Direct Instruction (CRSQ 2006), Accelerated Schools (Bloom et al. 
2001), America’s Choice (CRSQ 2006), Career Academies (Kemple and Scott-Clayton 2004), 
Project GRAD (Snipes et al 2006), First Things First (Quint et al 2005) and Talent Development 
(Kemple et al 2005).  Unfortunately the evaluation evidence about the effectiveness of CSR 
programs is, like with curricular reforms, quite limited. 
  At the elementary school level, a few models have been shown to improve student 
outcomes.  One of the more promising interventions seems to be Success for All (SFA), a 
comprehensive whole-school reform model that operates in more than 1,200 mostly high-poverty 
Title I schools.
9 SFA focuses on reading, with an emphasis on prevention and early intervention.  
Children receive 90 minutes each day of reading instruction in groups that are organized across 
grade levels based on each child’s current reading level, which helps teachers to target 
instruction. Students engage in cooperative learning exercises in which they discuss stories or 
learn from each other, which helps reinforce what teachers do and build social skills. Children 
are assessed at eight-week intervals, using both formal measures of reading competency and 
teacher observations. Children who fall behind are given extra tutoring or help with other 
problems, such as health or behavior problems.  The program utilizes regular classroom teachers 
who receive brief initial training, ongoing coaching, and other forms of support and professional 
development.  
                                                 
9 Several other elementary school models show promise, including Direct Instruction (CRSQ 2006).  One of the only 
other reform models that has been rigorously evaluated is the Comer Schools program, although one problem 
identified by the research is the limited degree of difference between Comer treatment schools and control schools in 
the implementation of Comer-style school practices (Cook et al. 1999, 2000).     18
A random assignment evaluation of SFA documented that at the end of three years, 
students in the treatment schools scored roughly 0.2 standard deviations higher than students in 
the control schools on a standardized reading assessment.  These effects were equivalent to about 
one-fifth the gap between low and high socioeconomic-status children (Borman et al., 2007).
  
SFA costs about $950 per student per year (Borman and Hewes 2003), with about two-thirds of 
this cost associated with the program’s tutoring component.  Current spending under the federal 
government’s Title I program is around $880 per eligible student, and that there is little evidence 
that Title I funding as typically deployed by public schools translates into much gain in student 
learning (Gordon, 2004, van der Klaauw, 2008).  One implication is that in schools serving 
predominantly poor students, SFA could be implemented mostly by just redeploying existing 
Title I funds.  If the experimental evaluation of SFA is correct and the program’s impact is 
anything like 0.2 standard deviations, this type of funding shift would easily pass a benefit-cost 
test, since Krueger (2003) shows that test score increases of this magnitude would increase the 
present value of each student’s lifetime earnings profile by thousands of dollars. 
  At the high school level, CSR models incorporate similar features, often involving a 
reorganization of the larger high school into smaller learning communities, referred to as “small 
schools,” “schools within a school,” and “learning academies.”  Small learning communities aim 
to provide a more personalized learning environment that will better engage and motivate 
students, and prevent at-risk students from “falling through the cracks.”  Other common reform 
features include work-based learning opportunities (e.g., internships) and assistance for students 
who enter high school with poor academic skills (Herlihy and Quint 2006). 
However to date there is little evidence that, as currently implemented, these high school 
CSR approaches improve student outcomes.  The most rigorous evaluation of a high school CSR   19
is the random assignment study of Career Academies, which are organized as small learning 
communities of between 150 and 200 high school students (often housed within larger, 
comprehensive high schools) that focus on a specific occupation or industry.  Unlike the 
vocational education programs that were popular in the 1970s and 1980s, career academies 
combine academic and technical curriculum, often using the technical curricula relevant to a 
particular industry to motivate students.  One hallmark of these programs is to establish a 
connection with employers in the given field, which occurs through mentors and internships of 
students with local employers.   
  Early results of the Career Academy evaluation indicated that students in the program 
reported that their school provided a more personalized learning environment relative to students 
in the control group.  The program raised attendance and completion of course credits in the 
early years of high school.  A later follow-up found no differences in high school completion 
rates between program and control groups, but did find a substantial impact on earnings among 
high-risk students (Kemple and Willner, 2008).  More research is needed to assess this approach, 
including evidence about whether the positive effects documented in the prior research would 
generalize to students who do not volunteer for the program, and whether the career academies 
studied as part of this evaluation are of higher quality than the typical career academy. 
The federal government could do more to improve the quality of research and 
development of curricular improvements or CRS, by for example holding “design competitions.”  
Federal, state and local governments could provide curriculum developers with incentives to do 
more rigorous evaluation of their products by requiring that schools devote resources to only 
those products that have been proven to be effective in randomized trials (see Jacob and Ludwig 
2005).  The Institute for Education Sciences is moving in this direction.  But the FDA’s   20
requirements that new drugs be subject to at least three phases of clinical trials highlights how far 
we are from providing parents the same assurances about the value of their children’s learning 
experiences at school. 
B. Teacher Labor Markets 
A key policy challenge for school districts is to induce more effective teachers to teach in 
high-poverty schools.  As discussed above, one strategy is to offer targeted financial incentives 
to individuals teaching in hard-to-staff schools and/or subjects.  But there are also a variety of 
potential inefficiencies in the way that schools hire, promote, and dismiss teachers.  At least 
some of the problems might be addressed without substantial increase in resources.
10 
One promising approach is to promote alternative pathways into teaching.  Traditional 
certification requirements impose a high cost (both in terms of money and time) on individuals 
interested in teaching, particularly on those with the best outside labor market options.  As a 
result certification requirements may help dissuade some highly skilled people from entering the 
teaching profession.  Many studies have explored the relative effectiveness of teachers with 
traditional versus alternative (or no) certification.  The emerging consensus is that differences 
between the groups are relatively small, and that in certain grades and subjects, teachers with 
alternative certification may actually outperform those with traditional certification (Boyd et al. 
2005; Kane, Rockoff and Staiger 2006, Glazerman et al. 2006).  Hence, alternative certification 
may improve the supply of teachers without reducing quality. 
Given the wide variation in effectiveness, policies that help school officials identify and 
hire the best applicants could have an important impact on student outcomes.  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
10 There has been little research on teacher “demand” policies.  One reason is the perception that disadvantaged 
school districts are in a state of perpetual shortage, and thus hire anyone that walks through the door.  In reality, 
while there are often shortages in certain subjects and grade levels, many disadvantaged districts have an ample 
supply of teachers for most positions.  For example, the Chicago Public Schools regularly receives 10 applications 
for each position.    21
there is little guidance that researchers can provide in this area. For example, staffing rules, late 
state budgets and inefficient human resource procedures dissuade many qualified applicants from 
teaching in urban schools (Levin and Quinn 2003; Levin et al. 2005).  This suggests that changes 
to collective bargaining agreements that reform staffing rules and a more efficient, customer-
focused approach to HR would improve teacher quality.
11 
Whatever system is used to hire teachers, it is inevitable that some teachers will not 
perform well in the classroom.  Recognizing that the hiring process is imperfect, virtually all 
school systems place new teachers on probation for several years, subjecting them to an up-or-
out tenure review.  However, in practice, public schools typically do not take advantage of the 
probationary period to obtain additional information about teacher effectiveness and weed out 
lower-quality teachers.
12 In New York City, for example, only about 50 out of roughly 75,000 
teachers were dismissed for performance-related reasons in recent years.
13  In the Chicago Public 
Schools, only 15 out of 11,621 teachers who were evaluated in 2007 received a rating of 
unsatisfactory, and only 641 out of 11,621 (roughly 5.5 percent) received a rating of satisfactory.  
The remaining teachers were rated excellent or superior.
14   
One possible solution is to raise the tenure bar for new teachers, and to deny tenure to 
those who are not effective at raising student achievement.  Some have suggested that this type 
of evaluation should be based at least in part on teacher value-added scores (e.g., Gordon et al. 
2006).   Other criteria could also be used in making high-stakes decisions such as teacher 
dismissals, given the concerns about the reliability and validity of value-added measures 
                                                 
11 The discussion draws on Jacob (2007).  Professional development, including mentoring for novice teachers, is 
another strategy for enhancing teacher ability.  Such policies are complements to the policies discussed in this 
section.  For a review, see Hill (2007). 
12 As mentioned earlier, professional development is clearly an important complement to the dismissal of 
underperforming probationary teachers.   
13 Personal communication with Jonah Rockoff, February 19, 2008.  
14 Calculations by Brian Jacob from CPS administrative records.   22
discussed earlier.  For example, while commonly measured teacher characteristics have little 
correlation with student achievement, principals do recognize which teachers are most effective.  
Jacob and Lefgren (2007) compare principal ratings of teacher effectiveness with “objective” 
measures of teacher effectiveness calculated using student achievement gains.  They find that 
principals can identify the best and worst teachers, but have little ability to distinguish between 
teachers in the middle of the ability distribution.  This suggests that principal evaluations could 
also be included as one factor in teacher tenure ratings, both because they may add additional 
information beyond student test scores, but also because they reduce potential negative effects of 
relying solely on an output-based measure (e.g., teachers cheating, or teaching narrowly to the 
test in order to maximize short-run student test scores at the cost of skills that will maximize 
long-term learning).  
One might still be concerned that principals would be hesitant to deny tenure to many 
teachers.  Several years ago, the Chicago Public Schools and Chicago Teachers’ Union signed a 
collective bargaining agreement which gave principals considerable latitude to dismiss untenured 
teachers.  Jacob (2008) finds that the teachers who were selected for dismissal did have more 
absences and lower value-added scores than other probationary teachers in the same school who 
were not selected for dismissal, suggesting that principals did consider productivity in making 
their decisions.  However, Jacob (2008) reports that 30-40 percent of principals – including many 
at very low-performing schools – did not dismiss any teachers, suggesting that some 
administrators may be reluctant to remove poorly performing employees.  One reason may be 
that it is difficult to hire high-quality replacements, and so principals might be reluctant to risk 
the chance of getting an even worse replacement.  It is also possible that principals are reluctant 
to incur the social and political costs associated with dismissal.  In either case, any policy to raise   23
the tenure bar will inevitably have to grapple with incorporating some system to ensure that 
difficult decisions are made.  
IV. INCENTIVES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Class size reduction is an “input-based” educational intervention, based on the 
assumption that schools will perform better with additional resources.  Comprehensive school 
reform is based on the assumption that schools are not utilizing optimal pedagogical practices, 
and therefore seeks to improve schooling outcomes by prescribing a more effective instructional 
approach. Both strategies assume that educators are willing to work as hard as they can given 
resource constraints.  Prescriptive approaches that push schools to adopt specific practices also 
assume that it does not make sense for individuals to continually “reinvent the wheel” and thus 
relies on centralized decision makers who presumably have better information about “best 
practices” for any given school than local principals and teachers.  An alternative approach to 
school reform focuses on enhancing both the incentives and flexibility enjoyed by school 
personnel. While the theories underlying school choice and school accountability differ in 
important ways, both strategies rely on the core notions of incentives and flexibility. In this 
section, we review the existing empirical work on how accountability and choice reforms impact 
student outcomes.   
The available evidence to date is probably strongest on behalf of the ability of school 
accountability systems to change the behavior of teachers and principals, although one lesson 
from that body of research is the great importance of getting the design of such policies right. 
A. Teacher merit pay 
Teacher compensation often arises in discussions of school reform.  Most public school 
teachers are paid according to strict formulas that incorporate years of service and credits of   24
continuing education including Master’s and doctorate degrees, despite the fact that research 
consistently finds that advanced degrees are not associated with better student performance and 
experience only matters in the first few years of teaching.  For this reason, reformers have 
suggested that a teacher’s compensation should be tied directly to her productivity as measured 
by student performance or supervisor evaluation.  Proponents of  “pay-for-performance,” also 
known as “merit” or “incentive” pay, argue that it would not only provide incentives for current 
teachers to work “harder” or “smarter,” but also could alter the type of people who enter the 
teaching force and then choose to remain. 
Critics of merit pay emphasize instead that teaching is a collaborative venture and that 
incentive pay for individuals could harm the teamwork necessary for effective schools.  They 
note that it is difficult to monitor teachers, and that because there are multiple objectives that we 
would like teachers to accomplish, a system that focuses on one easily observable outcome such 
as student test scores will likely distort teacher behavior in ways that harm other outcomes.  For 
example, teachers may focus attention more on the subjects that “count” under the performance 
system, or they may neglect students who they view as too far behind (or even too far ahead).  
Proponents counter that pay-for-performance systems can focus on teams of teachers or schools, 
and that one might incorporate principal evaluations as well as test scores to mitigate distortions.   
As Murnane and Cohen (1986) note, incentive pay has a long history in American 
education, though few systems that directly reward teachers on the basis of student performance 
have survived.  While many teachers indicate that their compensation incorporates some aspect 
of incentive pay, there are few examples of pay that is tied very closely with student 
performance.  One prominent example is the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), which 
incorporates incentive pay along with pay for additional professional development activities and   25
other service.  This program is more popular than many “old style” merit pay programs, and 
there is some evidence that they may improve student performance on standardized tests 
(Springer et al. 2008).  Given this tentative but positive evidence, there could be some benefit 
from continued experimentation by schools and districts with pay for performance, particularly if 
this experimentation is subject to careful evaluation as well.  
B. School accountability systems 
Recent studies suggest that accountability reforms can foster positive changes in behavior 
by school administrators, teachers, and students.  At the same time research provides some 
warnings that incentive-based reforms often generate unintended negative consequences, such as 
teachers neglecting certain students, cutting corners or even cheating to artificially raise student 
test scores.  The fact that actors within the school system do respond to changes in incentives 
highlights both the promise and pitfalls of accountability reform, and underscores the importance 
of the specific design details of accountability policies. 
While studies of school-based accountability policies in the eighties and nineties found 
mixed results (Jacob 2005),
  two major accountability reforms from the late 1990s – in Chicago 
and Florida – have demonstrated positive results.  In 1996, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) 
introduced a comprehensive accountability policy designed to raise academic achievement.  The 
first component of the policy focused on holding students accountable for learning, by ending a 
practice commonly known as “social promotion” whereby students are advanced to the next 
grade regardless of ability or achievement level.  In addition, the CPS also instituted a policy that 
placed low-performing schools on probation, which entailed a modest amount of additional 
resources along with enhanced monitoring and the threat of future closure.   26
Jacob (2005) finds that math and reading achievement increased sharply following the 
introduction of this accountability policy, in comparison to both prior achievement trends in the 
district and to changes experienced by other large, urban districts in the mid-west.  However, for 
younger students, the policy did not increase performance on a state-administered, low-stakes 
exam.  His analysis suggests that the observed achievement gains were driven by increases in 
test-specific skills and student effort. This finding is consistent with prior work suggesting that 
test preparation associated with high-stakes testing may artificially inflate achievement, 
producing gains that are not generalizable to other exams (see for example Koretz et al. 1991, 
Koretz and Barron 1998).  Note that the policy did lead to substantial achievement gains for older 
students, and that for older students the test-specific gains did likely represent real learning of the 
skills found on the high-stakes tests.  
Figlio and Rouse (2006) study Florida’s A+ Plan for Education, a school-based 
accountability system that was implemented several years before the introduction of No Child 
Left Behing.  In 1999, schools received “grades” based on their students’ test scores on the 
Florida Comprehensive Achievement Test (FCAT).  Under the A+ Plan, schools that received a 
failing grade (i.e., “F”) in two consecutive years were required to offer their students vouchers to 
enroll in private schools.  Schools that faced declining enrollments were subject to staff cuts, and 
additional sanctions.  It was hoped that the stigma associated with the highly visible failing 
grade, coupled with the threat of competition induced by the vouchers, would provide low-
performing schools with an incentive to improve. 
Figlio and Rouse (2006) find that the designation of a school as failing led to a significant 
increase in student math performance, on the order of 5 scale score points, roughly 0.1 standard 
deviations.  The impact of receiving an “F” on a low-stakes math test is about half as large.   27
Researchers studying later versions of Florida’s accountability system find similar effects 
(Chiang 2007, Rouse et al. 2007).   Moreover, they find that much of these learning gains were 
sustained in the following few years.  
While these studies suggest accountability policies can improve student achievement, 
other studies show that educators respond strategically to test-based accountability in many 
unintended ways, some of which may have negative consequences for students.  Jacob (2005) 
finds that educators in Chicago responded to the accountability program by placing a larger 
fraction of low-performing students in special education (thus removing them from the test-
taking pool
15), retaining a larger fraction of students before they reached the grades where they 
were subject to accountability mandates (i.e., in kindergarten through second grade), and by 
shifting attention away from subjects such as science and social studies that were not used to 
determine student or school sanctions under the accountability policy.  Each of these responses 
increased a school’s measured performance, even though they seem inappropriate and 
detrimental to student learning.  However, it is also possible that some, and perhaps most, 
educators viewed these steps as appropriate responses, which would benefit students.
16  A 
growing body of research also suggests that accountability systems generate larger 
improvements among students who are relatively closer to the passing threshold used to reward 
schools (Chakrabarty, 2006; Neal and Schatzenbach, 2007).  Finally, Jacob and Levitt (2003) 
find that the prevalence of teacher cheating rose sharply in low-achieving classrooms following 
the introduction of Chicago’s accountability policy.   
                                                 
15 Unlike more recent accountability reforms, the program in Chicago did not explicitly monitor the fraction of 
students who were tested so that placing students in special education would benefit a school rating. 
16 A struggling student may benefit from placement in special education services.  Similarly, teachers and 
administrators often believe that holding children back in an earlier grade provides them additional opportunities to 
mature and to master basic skills before moving on to higher grades.  Also, the focus on math and reading relative to 
science and social studies was one intended goal of the program.   28
   Two recent studies utilize data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) to assess the impact of standards-based accountability across a variety of states, rather 
than focusing on case studies of a single jurisdiction’s policy.  These studies are important 
because the NAEP data was not used by any state as part of its accountability program, which 
means educators had no incentive to manipulate test scores in the way that prior studies 
document has occurred for high-stakes exams in individual states.  Both studies find positive 
achievement effects overall, although they do not find evidence that accountability policies have 
consistently reduced the racial achievement gap (Carnoy and Loeb 2003; Hanushek and 
Raymond 2005).  
A review of simple national time trends in the recent NAEP data suggests that NCLB 
may have improved student achievement, particularly the math performance of younger children.  
However, to our knowledge, there has not been any systematic investigation of the impact of 
NCLB at a national level which attempts to account for prior achievement trends or the presence 
of other policies.   
Even without evaluation evidence of NCLB directly, the available accountability research 
suggests a number of modifications to NCLB that could potentially increase the effectiveness of 
the legislation.  The first of these is the adoption of a single achievement standard for all districts 
in the country.  The provision that allowed states to choose the tests they use for measuring 
student performance has resulted in vast disparities in the academic rigor of accountability 
requirements across states.  Given the political difficulty in imposing a uniform national 
standard, some national associations of state officials and educators have worked to voluntarily 
adopt common standards.  A second feature of NCLB that has come under scrutiny is the use of 
a single proficiency level --that is, holding schools accountable for the share of students with   29
scores above some single cutoff value – since this provides students an incentive to neglect 
students who are far above or below this threshold.  An alternative approach is for schools to be 
held accountable for the gains that all students make each year.  A third change to NCLB that 
has been discussed is to provide states and districts with flexibility to focus on the schools most 
in need of improvement, particularly if the current level of federal funding for NCLB is not 
increased substantially. 
C. School Choice  
  Another way to clarify goals or change incentives is to provide parents greater choice of 
schools for their children through public magnet schools, charter schools, or vouchers for 
students to attend private schools.  Choice proponents suggest that by creating a marketplace 
where parents can select schools, a choice-based system might generate competition among 
schools that would improve the quality of schools throughout the marketplace.  This theory rests 
on several assumptions, including that the degree of choice will be large enough to generate 
meaningful competition.  For example, a handful of charter schools with limited enrollment 
capacity are unlikely to generate meaningful competition in a large district.  This suggests that a 
choice system must permit relatively easy entry into the market by potential suppliers, which 
includes individuals and organizations wishing to open schools.  There must also be easy “exit” 
from the market that allows (and, indeed, forces) unsuccessful schools to close.
17 
  The second set of assumptions involves the information available to parents and the 
preferences they have for their children’s education.  Parents must have sufficient information to 
make an informed choice.  Data on school performance must be transparent, accessible and 
easily understood by parents with varying degrees of sophistication.  The effects of choice will 
                                                 
17 If the administrators and teachers in a public school that loses half of its students to a nearby charter school 
continue teaching the smaller group of students, or are merely reassigned to other schools in the district, they may 
not change their practices despite the pressure exerted by the nearby charter.   30
also depend in large part on the nature of the preferences themselves.  Expanded choice is only 
likely to increase student academic outcomes if achievement is a central concern for parents.
  
The most rigorous studies to assess parental preferences typically find that parents place a 
high value on proximity and student racial composition (Glazerman 2000, Calvo 2006, Hastings 
et al. 2006).  On average, parents place limited value on the “academic quality” of the school as 
measured by things like student test scores, though parents with higher income tend to place a 
higher priority on test scores (Hastings et al. 2006).  While these results suggest that choice plans 
may not lead to higher performance among poor children, there is some evidence that providing 
poor families with more transparent information about school quality does lead parents to select 
“better” schools in terms of academic performance (Hastings et al. 2007).  
  Even if school choice does not foster competition that increases the productivity of 
schooling overall, the opportunity to choose may still have a positive effect on students.  Choice 
might allow a student to attend a school with better teachers, more resources, or more studious 
peers.  Whether this re-sorting of children across schools improves average outcomes for all 
children, or simply changes the distribution of academic achievement across children, depends 
on whether some children gain more from “better” peer settings than others.  Of course, if the 
goal is to reduce inequity in schooling opportunities and outcomes, and school choice provides 
choices to disadvantaged students who would not have them otherwise, then choice may still 
have served a worthwhile purpose.  Some argue that choice provides poor parents the 
opportunities that wealthier parents have always had. 
  The availability of choice may also improve student outcomes if it allows parents to find 
schools that are a better “match” for their individual child’s needs, which in principle could   31
allow most students to benefit from choice.
18  Some would argue that if choice allows parents to 
select the type of schools they want, the system should be considered a success.  While this may 
be true from the parents’ perspective, if society values certain outcomes more than others, then 
free choice on the part of parents may not maximize social welfare. 
There are hundreds of studies on school choice, ranging from studies of charter schools to 
private voucher plans.  However, the vast majority of research in this area suffers from a critical 
limitation, which researchers refer to as selection bias.  Students who utilize school choice 
(whether it is a public magnet school, a charter school or a private school) differ from students 
who do not, both in terms of easily observable ways such as race, income and achievement level, 
but also likely in more subtle ways such as personal motivation or family support.  If researchers 
do not account for such differences when comparing, for example, charter schools with 
neighborhood public schools, then the results can be misleading.   
  The best studies of the impact of attending a public school of choice on student 
achievement overcome the problem of selection bias mentioned above by focusing on choice 
schools that are oversubscribed and use random lotteries to determine admission.  By comparing 
the outcomes of students who win and lose lotteries, the researchers can estimate the causal 
impact of attending a public school of choice.  Looking at elementary and high schools in 
Chicago, Cullen et al. (2006, forthcoming) find that winning a choice lottery has no effect on a 
wide range of academic outcomes.
19  In a study of school choice lotteries in the Charlotte-
Mecklenberg school district, Hastings et al. (2006a) find that, on average, students do not benefit 
from winning one of the lotteries and attending their preferred school.  However, when they 
                                                 
18 For example, the back-to-basics, discipline-oriented “academy” may be a good fit for some students, while other 
children may thrive more in an environment that provides more flexibility and autonomy.  The match may reflect 
more mundane needs, including proximity to the parents’ work or the availability of a particular elective. 
19 For high school students, the authors find some evidence that winning a choice lottery improves certain non-
academic outcomes such as the likelihood of getting into trouble with the police.   32
examine children whose parents seemed to place a greater value on academics (based on the type 
of schools they chose), the authors find that these students do experience higher test scores from 
winning the public school choice lottery.  Finally, as noted above, there is some evidence that 
career academies, one prominent type of public choice school, have positive effects on student 
outcomes (Cullen et al. 2005, Kemple and Willner, 2008). 
A parallel literature analyzes the effect of attending a charter school on academic 
outcomes, and yields similarly mixed outcomes. Several studies find small negative or zero 
effects (Hanushek et al. 2005, Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006).  A recent random evaluation 
of New York City charters uses a lottery-based research design, comparing students who win and 
lose lotteries to oversubscribed charter schools, and finds robust positive effects (Hoxby and 
Murarka 2007).  This approach removes concerns about selection bias, but has the drawback of 
focusing on a small number of particularly successful (or at least popular) charter schools.   
Perhaps the most contentious form of school choice involves vouchers that allow students 
to attend private schools.  Voucher experiments in Milwaukee, New York, Dayton and 
Washington, DC have been evaluated.  These studies typically focus on comparing outcomes 
between students who are versus are not offered the chance to attend private schools.  While the 
results in most cities were discouraging, the evaluation in NYC pointed to some modest test 
score gains for African-American children, although the magnitude of these results has been 
debated (Howell et al. 2002, Krueger and Zei 2004).  
The most difficult area of school choice to analyze empirically is the claim that choice will foster 
competition that will, in turn, improve the productivity of all schools. Hoxby (2000) compared 
geographic areas, and found that those areas with more school choice for largely historical 
reasons (e.g. the presence of streams and rivers which made transportation difficult in earlier   33
times, and thus encouraged areas to divide themselves along the boundary of such waterways), 
had more productive schools, suggesting that greater choice is associated with greater efficiency 
in schooling.  However, others have argued that these results are not particularly robust 
(Rothstein 2006, Hoxby 2006).  Urquiola (2005) finds evidence of sorting: the “best” public 
school students left for the private sector.  Areas with greater district choice tend to have a 
smaller fraction of students attending private schools, but these districts also have schools that 
are more racially homogenous. 
In summary, there is mixed evidence on whether the opportunity to attend a choice 
school – public magnet, charter or private – has substantial academic benefits for poor children 
as well as on the question of whether large scale choice programs might improve the productivity 
of schools in a general.  It is premature to make strong claims about whether such policies can 
have substantial benefits for disadvantaged children.  Perhaps the main risk associated with 
expanded choice opportunities is the possibility of exacerbating the segregation of poor, minority 
or low-performing students within a subset of schools.  This seems to have happened to some 
degree in New Zealand and Chile under the large-scale choice plans adopted there (Fiske and 
Ladd, 2000, Ladd and Fiske, 2001, Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006).  However as both Neal (2002) 
and Ladd (2002) point out, the effects of any choice plan is likely to depend crucially on the 
details of key design questions, such as whether schools are allowed to select the best students 
from their applicant pools.  Many of the current public school choice plans require over-
subscribed schools to admit students on the basis of lotteries, providing some guard against this 
type of sorting.  Additional experimentation by states and districts with different forms of public 
school choice (e.g., magnet or charter schools) would provide additional opportunities to learn 
more about their potential impacts.   34
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The release of the landmark Coleman Report in 1966 fostered pessimism about the ability 
of schools to improve the life chances of poor children.  The report found that a variety of school 
“inputs” such as teacher educational attainment and per pupil spending were only weakly 
correlated with student test scores, and raised questions about what schools could accomplish 
without broader changes in social policy.  The Coleman Report and subsequent research pushed 
policymakers to consider outcome-based measures of success and spurred interest in reform 
strategies that focus on changing the incentives within the public school system.   
A careful review of the empirical evidence, however, suggests a variety of policies that 
are likely to substantially improve the academic performance of poor children.  Importantly, we 
found examples of successful programs or policies within each of the three broad categories 
outlined in the introduction. Targeted investment of additional resources in early childhood 
education, smaller class sizes and bonuses for teachers in hard-to-staff schools and subjects seem 
likely to pass a cost-benefit test, even without a fundamental re-organization of the existing 
public school system.  At the same time, researchers have identified some ways of changing 
standard operating procedures within schools that can improve the outcomes of poor children 
even without large amounts of additional spending.  Examples include the adoption of 
comprehensive school reform models like Success for All and Career Academies and the 
expansion of alternative certification opportunities.  Finally, policies that seek to change 
incentives within schools, such as the accountability policies adopted by districts and states since 
the mid-1990s, offer some promise of improving schooling for poor children.   
Given limited financial resources and perhaps even more limited political attention, it is 
unlikely that policymakers could adopt all of the “successful” practices discussed in this chapter.    35
Based on our read of the empirical literature, the following education policies seem likely to 
generate the largest gains in academic achievement among poor children:   
1.  Increased investments in early childhood education for poor children.  Even though 
short-term gains in IQ or achievement test scores diminish over time, there is 
evidence of long-term improvement in a variety of outcomes such as educational 
attainment that will help children escape from poverty as adults.  Increased 
investment in early childhood education may be particularly productive and important 
given the limited investment our society currently makes in the cognitive 
development of very young children. 
2.  Taking advantage of the opportunity provided by No Child Left Behind (NCLB) to 
better utilize accountability reforms to improve outcomes for poor children.  NCLB 
was enacted in 2001 with bipartisan support, although it has received considerable 
criticism in recent years.  But the debate over the existence of NCLB seems to miss a 
fundamental lesson we have learned about accountability in the past decade: the 
specific design of the program matters enormously.  Potentially productive changes to 
NCLB (as well as to co-existing state or district accountability systems) include: 
adopting common achievement standards across states, focusing accountability on 
student growth rather than proficiency levels, providing states and districts with the 
flexibility to focus limited resources on the most needy schools, and reconciling 
federal and state accountability systems. 
3.  Provide educators incentives to adopt practices with a compelling research base while 
expanding efforts (including resources) to develop and identify effective instructional 
regimes.  One of the lessons from the accountability movement is that highly   36
disadvantaged schools (and districts) often lack the capacity to change themselves.  
There is good evidence that certain comprehensive school reforms such as Success 
for All can raise achievement levels among poor children with little additional 
expenditures.  Similarly, there is compelling evidence that alternative certification 
routes into teaching can expand the supply of teachers willing to work in hard-to-staff 
schools and subjects while maintaining, or perhaps even increasing, teacher quality.  
State and district officials could ensure that disadvantaged schools, particularly those 
that have continued to fail under recent accountability system, adopt instructional 
practices and related policies with a strong research base.  This would help avoid the 
constant reinvention of the wheel.  At the same time, the Federal government could 
help spur such advantages through more focused R&D spending (e.g., perhaps 
through “design competitions” as suggested by Slavin 1997), and governments at all 
levels could help increase the supply of high-quality practices by requiring schools to 
use programs that have been rigorously evaluated (Jacob and Ludwig, 2005). 
4.  Continue to support and evaluate a variety of public school choice options.  The other 
noteworthy trend in output-based reform aside from NCLB is the spread of public 
school choice at the local level.  While we believe that the current evidence on the 
benefits of public school choice is limited, the risk associated with these policies 
seems small so long as they are implemented in ways that do not substantially 
exacerbate school segregation along race or class lines.  Hence, there could be 
considerable benefit to expanding magnet and charter schools, and to carefully 
evaluating the impact of these schools on the students they serve as well as the 
surrounding schools.     37
Most anti-poverty policies focus on lifting adults out of poverty.  These policies are often 
controversial because of an unavoidable tension between the desire to help people who have 
been unlucky and the motivation to encourage hard work and punish socially unproductive 
behavior.  In contrast, successful education policies can not only help reduce poverty over the 
long term by making poor children more productive during adulthood, but also foster economic 
growth that expands the “pie” for everyone.  Educational interventions arguably also benefit 
from a compelling moral justification as well.  Many people believe that disadvantaged children 
should not be punished for the circumstances into which they are born, and improved education 
policy is one of the best ways to prevent this from happening.  
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